A Click Away from Democracy: The Internet’s Effect on Civil Society Development & Democratization by Warycha, James
University at Albany, State University of New York
Scholars Archive
Political Science Honors College
5-2011
A Click Away from Democracy: The Internet’s
Effect on Civil Society Development &
Democratization
James Warycha
University at Albany, State University of New York
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_pos
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political
Science by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.
Recommended Citation
Warycha, James, "A Click Away from Democracy: The Internet’s Effect on Civil Society Development & Democratization" (2011).
Political Science. 9.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_pos/9
A Click Away from Democracy: 
The Internet’s Effect on Civil Society 
Development & Democratization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James Warycha 
Department of Political Science 
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy 
University at Albany, SUNY 
Undergraduate Honors Thesis 
Faculty Adviser: Cheng Chen, PhD.  
Warycha   1 
 
Introduction 
 “It is only in a society which possesses the greatest freedom, and which consequently 
involves a thorough Antagonism of its members – with, however, the most exact determination 
and guarantee of the limits of this freedom in order that it may coexist with the freedoms of other 
– that the highest purpose of nature, which is the development of all her capacities, can be 
attained in the case of mankind” (Kant 2005, 93). It appears that, here, Immanuel Kant 
forewarned of a day when the world would be intertwined by some mechanism, that the most 
basic aspects of our societies would be able to spread to areas far beyond their physical reach. It 
is an idea that pervades his democratic peace theory, and a great deal of his other works. 
However, here he is playing the part of augur rather than scholar. Still, this quote reflects an even 
larger question that has been prolific in democratization studies over the past few decades: is 
democracy possible in regions unaffiliated with Western culture and customs? With the 
introduction of the Internet to democratization studies, this question has become even more 
significant to an increasingly globalizing world (Keane 2005, 289-291). 
This is the broader story behind the possibility of the Internet having a positive 
correlation with the development of democracy. The intimate part of this story, however, as 
scholars have found over the years, is that the Internet’s impact on civil society is the specific 
catalyst toward democratization (Edwards 2009, 113-114; Hill 2003, 527-533). It therefore 
becomes vital to explain further the connection between the Internet and the development of civil 
society, as this indirectly has been correlated by scholars with the development of democracy 
(Diamond 2008, 99-101). Furthermore, the growing prominence of civil society’s discussion in 
scholarly works over the past 15 years is prodigious to say the least. With the fall of Communism 
and the continuing attempts by the Western world to promote democracy abroad, civil society 
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has risen in this sector of democratization studies to be seen as one of the most fundamental 
pieces of democracy (Edwards 2009, 2). However, this intrinsic pairing between civil society and 
democracy has as many detractors as it does supporters. Is civil society specific to the capitalist 
nation-states so prominent in the West? Or, alternatively, is civil society a “universal expression 
of the collective life of individuals” that has no bounds, be it culture or context (Edwards 2009, 
3)? These questions on the validity of civil society in the democratization debate make my 
research troubling, to say the least. It is this reason why I intend to leave democracy out as much 
as possible from my final research design and to draw only oblique conclusions on democracy.  
It may be obvious to you now that in the realm of democratization studies, there has been 
an increase in interest in regards to the effects of the Internet. This sub-sect of communication 
and media studies has been gaining prominence for obvious reasons—over the past decade 
global Internet usage has increased by almost 400%. For every 100 people, currently 86 people 
have access to the Web, an increase of about 50 people over the past ten years (“Internet Users” 
2009). So, it has been a consistent theme in the literature to link democracy and the Internet, 
however indirectly (Freedman 2009; Friedman, Hochstetler, & Clark 2005; Guillén & Suárez 
2005). This radical increase in the number of Internet users introduces another theme: mass 
mobilization. Where public outreach has failed, can more private, anonymous forms of outreach 
be more successful? Social movement theory indicates that movements are finite moments in 
history, and after a desired outcome is achieved, the necessity of groups formed by this 
movement is evanescent (Diamond 2008, 65-71). The groups that have more staying power, 
then, will reflect a civil society, and perhaps the beginnings of democratization.    
 Still, the over looming complication comes in the form of different cultural influences. 
The lack of data surrounding the Internet and civil society in historically religious states, 
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specifically those that have declared themselves to be Islamic states (meaning their state religion 
is Islam), is of particular interest to my study. A state’s declaration of a national religion is of 
great importance in terms of cultural influence, then. The question to my work therefore 
becomes, what effect does the Internet have on civil society development within Islamic states? I 
will analyze two fundamentally Islamic states of somewhat similar characteristics, the main 
similarity of course being the level of proliferation of the Internet in that state. I will also 
evaluate Israel due to its religious state status, and its unique democratic characteristic. I will 
provide further detail on my research design following a comprehensive analysis of the literature 
and a more formalized presentation of my hypothesis.  
Literature Review 
When looking at the literature, one can notice a significant divide in the theories, ideas, 
and approaches as written by different scholars. Collectively, I can place the extant literature in 
this field into three divisions by content: (1) regional based analysis, particularly with a strong 
emphasis on East Asia and a minor amount of research on Eastern Europe, (2) research focusing 
on access to media in general and its effects on democratization, and (3) research evaluating the 
relationship between Islamic states and democracy. However, none of these topics address 
directly the question I am looking to answer, which indicates the gap in the literature in religious 
and democratic studies that I acknowledged previously. Ultimately, little research exists in the 
analysis of the Internet’s affect on “religious” states, even if the region those scholars are 
examining has strong religious roots in its government, society, or economy. Most scholars, 
when looking at the characteristics of states in its relationship to any form of media look only to 
the regime type (i.e.: democratic, authoritarian, communist, etc.). Still, all of this research is 
incredibly pertinent to my study, as it will inform the context of my studies. The works may not 
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be dealing with the minutiae of religious politics that I intend to examine, but the methodologies 
and findings will certainly inform the variables I examine. Moreover, some of the work done in 
specific regions is very similar to the research I will be doing on the Middle East.  
Theory 
I will first address the larger theoretical arguments that have been presented by scholars. 
Specifically, in order to discern the more complicated research that has informed my hypothesis, 
the larger theoretical background is incredibly pertinent. Little evidence is presented that sees the 
Internet directly influencing democracy, and there are few studies that have even analyzed this 
relationship in a direct manner. Thusly, the two major theoretical arguments that will be 
evaluated in my research fundamentally pertain to the Internet’s affect on civil society, and the 
implications of civil society development on the development of democracy. What I found in 
both of these theoretical questions were conflicting results. 
 There are several camps projecting different kinds of results on the effect of the Internet 
on government and society. Some have projected that there is little evidence that the Internet has 
had any immediate effect on democratization, while others find the Internet to be the next logical 
step toward democratization in a globalizing world context (Lonkila 2008, 1131-1138; Lord 
2006, 5-18). Kristin M. Lord, perhaps the strongest proponent of the former view, expresses that 
“unfortunately, greater transparency [by way of the Internet] will not always foster 
understanding or peace and sometimes will make conflicts worse” (Lord 2006, 50). She asserts 
that the proliferation of Internet use through greater access will actually result in an increase in 
civil society which will have a negative effect on the development of democracy. This 
specifically contradicts the works of Kant in his democratic peace theory and complicates the 
works of other scholars, most predominantly Charles Tilly, Larry Diamond, and Ernest Gellner. 
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They find that civil society, no matter how contentious, will ultimately improve democratic 
institutions in inchoate democracies or help to create democratic institutions in those states that 
have none (Friedman, Hochstetler, and Clark 2005, 159-161; Gellner 1991). This is also implicit 
to the theory that democratization is always occurring, and therefore is a process, meaning that 
democratic institutions can be improved upon in extant democracies (Tilly 2007). However, it is 
quite remarkable that in spite of the effect that Lord finds civil society to have on democracy, her 
ultimate conclusion finds that the Internet does indeed correlate positively with civil society. In 
this respect, her results compliment, quite well, proponents of the Internet’s correlation with civil 
society, even if they do not completely agree on the implications civil society has for democracy.  
Clearly then, most of the extant research places a strong emphasis on the relationship 
between democratization and civil society. Moreover, as I have acknowledged, studies have 
shown that the Internet has the capability to increase levels of civil society (Freedman 2009; 
Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009). Still, scholars have found that some external factors need to 
be considered when examining the effect of civil society on democracy. In the case of 
Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani’s work, that external factor were foreign interventionist actors. Due 
to the increased funding by foreign NGOs and civil society groups, Georgia was able to 
democratize successfully in the early millennium. However, as soon as that support began to 
wane, Georgia’s democratization process halted and eventually began to reverse itself. It is 
therefore key to understand from this case that civil society from within the country is necessary 
(Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009). Other works support this caveat, specifically that of Lam, 
which, instead of focusing on an Eastern European state, focuses on East Asia and Macau. He, 
like Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani determines that civil society support from international actors 
can actually hinder development of domestic civil society in the long run (Lam 2008).  
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In regards to the effect of civil society on democracy, most, save for the few detractors 
mentioned previously, typically assert that civil society is indeed a vital part in the 
democratization process (Diamond 2008, 102-105). The few arguments that elucidate on the 
detrimental aspects of civil society in relation to democratization are largely unqualified for a 
variety of features. Inglehart and Welzel, while not refuting the importance of civil society in the 
development of democracy, find that there is a missing step between civil society and 
democratization: economic development. They argue that without the “elite-centered” push for 
economic prosperity in democratic transitions, civil society is ineffectual in democratization 
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 15-18). However, problematic in their argument is the assumption 
that civil society can only develop following the breakup of an authoritarian regime. While the 
existing literature generally speculates that regime type is an important determinant to the affect 
of civil society there, Inglehart and Welzel’s work ignores that authoritarian regimes have in the 
past adopted democratic features in order to perpetuate a façade of unity between government 
and people. Therefore, modernization theory is not necessarily applicable in the case of civil 
society due to these outlier factors (Diamond 2008, 103-105, 157-160; Alexander 2004, 607-
609). Arguments similar to Inglehart and Welzel that discuss the liberalization of the economy’s 
effect on democracy also appear to imply the opposite of what they are saying; instead of liberal 
economic development being a precursor to democracy, it actually follows civil society. Other 
theorists argue that this liberalization has caused harm to democratic development (Sandel 2005, 
196-199). It is therefore difficult to take their argument seriously then, with stronger arguments 
favoring the opposite, and a wealth of other works asserting a different causal mechanism.  
Moreover, the few arguments that did not favor civil society having an impact on the 
development of democracy made the mistake of looking at the media or the Internet as directly 
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having an impact on democratic development (Lord 2006). However, as Muskhelishvili and 
Jorjoliani assert, media does not directly affect democratization processes (2009). In fact, Ivor 
Garber proposes that the “paradox of political communications” in fact deters from democracy. 
This mostly pertains to its ability to make politicians that much more aware of the message they 
are portraying rather than the actual policy. Garber takes the case study of the Department of 
Health in the United Kingdom by examining the amount of positive press releases they issued in 
2006 versus how positive those releases actually were in a rather unique study to provide 
evidence for his thesis (Garber 2007). 
 The strengths of those arguments behind the positive impact of civil society on 
democratic development is further questioned as I also previously touched upon Lord’s work on 
the relationship between the Internet and democracy. Lord’s stance is similar in regards to civil 
society’s affect on democracy. However, as is typical of her work, she finds that in spite of her 
findings on a weak relationship between civil society and democracy, she finds that there is some 
decentralizing effect of transparency through the Internet and media that bodes well for liberal, 
democratic features to develop (Lord 2006, 93-96). Backtracking in this kind of theoretical 
literature is common, while the research indicating no relationship between democracy and civil 
society, or the Internet and civil society are few.  
Region Based Analysis 
I will now discuss at greater length the regional studies that are most prevalent in this 
realm of democratization and communications studies. Typically, in terms of Internet research, 
most studies focused on East Asia, albeit most strongly on China, and a few used Russia and 
other post-Soviet states in their analysis. In general, there is a discrepancy as to whether or not 
the Internet actually hurts or helps democracy, and, as I have already elaborated on, some works 
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focus specifically on that question (Lord 2006; Finel and Lord 1999; Best and Wade 2009). The 
research in the realm of East Asia and the increased levels of Internet technologies and its 
accessibility’s effect on democracy there address this dichotomy. Most scholars agree that 
whether a state de-democratizes or democratizes due to the Internet is dependent on two things: 
(1) regime type of the controlling government and (2) the freedom of the Internet there (Chung 
2007; Alexander 2004, 1135-1136). In Chung’s paper “Diffusing Power on Concentrating 
Control,” he evaluates the degree to which civil society and democracy develop in China and 
Korea due to the Internet. He finds, as I previously stated, that due to the restrictions over the 
Internet in China, little comes about from online to offline protest. Conversely, Korea has no 
restrictions on the Internet, and most protests generate from online to offline. Thus, when the 
Internet has greater levels of freedom, civil society has less restrictions on development, and can 
even maintain a level of secrecy that allows them to express their opinions in an anonymous 
forum (Chung 2007). 
Further elaborating on the factor of regime type, studies also show that it is possible that 
the Internet could have a purpose beyond the extension of social networks and civil society. In 
the case of Singapore, the Internet was a device used in order to prevent future economic 
catastrophe. The authoritarian regime, not unlike that of China, was unaffected by placing these 
cyber infrastructures in place and granting greater access to the population in order for them to 
trade economic information. However, while civil society internally was not affected 
significantly, a variety of external actors have tried to exploit Singapore’s information flow in 
order to provoke change in government (Rodan 2000, 219-220).   
This study of Singapore is also revelatory of another consistent theme in the studies of 
Internet and democratization relations—technological progress. It goes without saying that 
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technology develops, gets better, and becomes integrated into larger segments of the population 
over time. So, while many of the studies focused in East Asia and Eastern Europe see few results 
happening now, they postulate that the current trends indicate that the future will see progress in 
civic action and eventual democratization (Lonkila 2008, 1145-1146; McGlinchey and Johnson 
2007, 284-286; Best and Wade 2009). It is therefore important to understand the impact of time 
in regards to the subject of Internet proliferation and democratization. Furthermore, the literature 
suggests that democracy has only recently begun to have an effect on democratization because of 
these technological advances, which is evident based on the correlations that were barely existent 
between 1992 and 2002, but were very apparent when only looking at a dataset taken in a one-
year-period between 2001 and 2002 (Best and Wade 2009). 
Media/Internet Access 
Few argue that the correlations between democracy and the Internet that have occurred 
over the past decade are spurious; there is some significant connection between the two, albeit 
indirect. Some do argue that the correlation may be in reverse, however (Guillén and Suárez 
2005; Ott and Rosser 2000). These arguments assert that democracies incur the Internet because, 
typically, democracies are the wealthiest, most developed countries. Then, in reality, democracy, 
indirectly, causes growth in Internet usage, and not the other way around. This research, 
however, is refuted quite effectively in a variety of other studies that cite poorer, more destitute 
states supporting the growth of the Internet and seeing positive civic, democratic results (Chung 
2007; Lonkila 2008). Moreover, as I found in the theoretical literature, modernization theory 
through the liberalization and opening of the economy has seemed to be an ineffective model for 
explaining the associations evidenced between civil societies and democracies (Diamond 2008, 
103-105). This explanation’s strident evaluation of civil society based on the government in 
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power can be a valid one, as I have also previously acknowledged in the literature, specifically 
with Alexander’s work on Russia and Eastern Europe Internet development. However, in only 
analyzing the economic features, the scholars have missed some of the exceptional cases. 
(Diamond 2008, 157-160) 
 In spite of all of this evidence in the contrary, access to the Internet has proven to be a 
viable way to study the civil society phenomenon. Halfway through this decade, less than 10% of 
the world had access to the Internet, and while that number has grown it stands to be reasoned 
that the “freeness” of the Internet has posed a challenge (Guillén and Suárez 2005, 681-682). 
Some of the literature that I came across, specifically those detailing Internet proliferation in 
China, spend quite a bit of time discussing the level of freedom Internet users have in access to 
their Internet. So, while Internet access has increased, the literature at present acknowledges the 
limitations in their research in regards to how censored that Internet is, and, therefore, how 
reliable that Internet is for a growing civic community (Chung 2007; Rodan 2000). 
Generally, in spite of these differences in region of study or in conclusions, most of these 
works take a stance on the theory that civil society is a critical feature in moving the 
democratization process along. However, as I have noted previously, where some of them differ 
is in how the Internet and increased access to information affect civil society, and, by 
consequence, democracy. Most research shows that the Internet, when made as available and free 
as possible, will be a positive and constructive influence on civil society. This of course 
introduces the question as to what a free and accessible Internet actually is. While one can only 
make indirect abstractions as to what a free Internet looks like, it can be assumed that a free 
Internet is one that allows for its users to access certain sites unencumbered by governmental 
intervention and clandestine surveillance. While the latter is definitely common of the Internet in 
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all states of sophisticated Internet technologies, the former is something that can be readily 
measured in a meaningful way in the context of this research. More authoritarian governments 
are prone to using the Internet to find dissident members of society and prevent their ideas from 
reaching broader populations. This limits access and certainly prevents a freedom of speech that 
is supposedly pivotal to the Internet’s “anonymous” appeal.  
Islam and Democracy 
In relation to the possibility of democracy in an Islamist state, the literature reflects two 
different points of view. Some work looks toward the example of liberalizing countries, like 
Turkey. Here they establish that the desire to modernize and join the EU has provoked deeply 
democratic sentiments in a state that is socially ingrained in religion. While Turkey is still in 
progress with syncretizing and reconciling the seemingly disparate aspects of Islam and 
secularism, it appears there has been some positive enforcement there (Grigoriadis 2009). Other 
works point to the Iranian example, which looks like a democracy but in actuality is far from one 
due to the Islamic leadership. Ultimately though, little work has been done on the growing 
prominence of the Internet in Islamic states which may be able to explain certain phenomena 
(Jahanbegloo 2009). 
This disparity in the presentation of Islamic states as either “liberal” or “despotic” is 
consistent in the literature I found in regards to Islam and the prospects for democracy in states 
of a fundamentally Islamic background. However, it is vital in my research to be able to discern 
between different levels of Islamic fundamentalism in these states. Therefore, while consistently 
reevaluating the example of Turkey, the research I looked further into detailed those states that 
had declared Islam as her official religion. The work, when referencing exclusively Islam, sees 
that there is no inherent problem in the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Ultimately, what 
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Islam can be seen to be incompatible with is the Western conception of democracy, and its 
reliance on the sovereignty of the people (Abootalebi 1999). This, of course, was a common 
theme in the literature, which ultimately establishes that Western conceptions of civil society, 
democracy, and modernization are different from those in other regions of the world, specifically 
the Middle East and Asia.  
Additionally, where the work has shortcomings in regards to Internet theory, it is 
abundant in media studies within the region. Marc Raboy’s work describes the media within a 
possibly democratizing Islamic world, and distinguishes the effect of Internet policy there as 
somewhat trite considering the level of access there. However, like East Asian communication 
researchers, he determines that Internet proliferation will continue and ultimately have a positive 
effect (Raboy 2003). 
Furthermore, few studies actually discuss at length the development of civil society in 
these Islamic states. Only one study in particular stood out, and it was an intensive cased study 
and reliant on field research in the states that the scholar was examining. This qualitative study 
looked at the role of new media in “internet cafes” in Jordan and Egypt. The author interviewed 
more than 200 subjects there, which she then compiled in order to emphasize the use of 
information technology in grassroots campaigns. Furthermore, she finds that information 
technology diffusion via internet cafes has increased the civic culture and engagement within the 
Arab world (Wheeler 2006). However, aside from this one study, few studies addressed the 
broader democratic emphasis and its implications on civil society and vice versa. This serious 
lack of information on Islamic states and the development of civil society via the Internet is, 
ultimately, what I used as a catalyst for my project.  
Hypothesis 
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Research in the realm of democratization studies indicates a great disparity in findings 
about the impact of Internet freedom and growth on developing democracies. Some scholars 
theorize that growing levels of Internet have had, and will continue to have, an adverse affect on 
the process of democratization (Best & Wade 2009; Fine & Lord 1999; Guillén & Suárez 2005; 
Lord 2006). These scholars assert that the Internet creates a way for the government to monitor 
its people better, and therefore prevent free speech, instead of promote it. Other scholars argue 
the opposite, that increases in this form of media and consequently in access governmental 
information lead to higher levels of democracy and increases in democratization processes (Lord 
2006, 1-6). While it is still debatable as to which side of the issue is actually correct, I find that 
the arguments surrounding the latter to be more informed and generally accurate in their 
research. While Internet proliferation has seen cases of negativity in democracies, those cases are 
few and rather circumstantial, as I have discussed in my review of the existing literature. 
In addition to finding this relationship between democracy and Internet, a great deal of 
literature discusses the role of the Internet in conjunction with a state’s freedom. However, what 
was quite disconcerting was that few took into consideration the dominant religion of that state, 
and the effect it had on democracy. Furthermore, those few that did discuss regime orientation in 
their work left out tribal governments/systems and states with strong religious backgrounds in 
favor of the more easily definable “authoritarian” or “democratic.” (Alexander 2004, 624) I 
would like to take this area of democratization studies and elaborate on it further in its 
relationship with the Internet and democratization.  
However, what I will ultimately be looking into is not simply one hypothesis, as I am not 
examining only one theory and one question. The questions of research are twofold: (1) does 
civil society increase democracy in states of a dominant religion, and (2) does the Internet 
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increase civil society in those religious states? These questions present themselves largely due to 
the theoretical arguments that I presented in my literature review. Ultimately, what I found was 
that when civil society increases in a state, typically in spite of government, religion, or other 
factors, that state also saw an improvement in its democratic practice. Furthermore, the link 
between the Internet and the development of civil society has proven to be an incredibly valid 
and growingly important theory in democratization studies, due to the implications for the initial 
democratization steps. (Tilly 2007; Diamond 2005; Lonkila 2008) Therefore, I hypothesize 
based on what I have found in my research that if access to the Internet increases in Islamic 
states, civil society will also increase. It will be of pertinence in future research to examine 
whether or not when civil society increases in an Islamic state, if democratization processes also 
increase. 
Due to the United States involvement in the Middle East, and attempts at building 
democracy there, this topic is hugely pertinent to political scientists and policymakers in the 
Western world. Moreover, the string of protests along the Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula 
that have persisted since the end of 2010 have remarkable implications in regard to social media 
and the Internet’s effect on popular civic protest. Additionally, in terms of academia, I find that 
this will be a topic through which I will be able to make a statement about the relationship 
between democracy and the Internet without being terminal or incredibly general. Through 
exploring other outlier features that were discussed in the literature, I will also be able to avoid 
spurious correlations and conclusions, making my work both falsifiable and valid in a larger 
context. 
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Concepts and Methodology 
 When considering the research of any social science, it is, of course, important to lay a 
groundwork from which to base one’s analysis. Therefore, in the context of my research into the 
Web development of states, there must be a solid foundation of what I mean by certain terms. 
Moreover, as I begin my analysis, it will be paramount to my study to elaborate on the paradigms 
and areas through which I make my qualitative observations.  
Civil Society  
Of course, perhaps most important in my evaluation is what I mean by the term “civil 
society.” The various definitions of civil society that have been formulated are somewhat recent 
phenomena in political science, and because of this ingenuity these definitions have become a 
source of contention amongst various scholars. I look to the works of Charles Tilly for a 
definitive account of what is meant by civil society in the context of democracy and democracy-
building.  Referring to the conference of society as “the voice,” Tilly argues that when people get 
together in any way, whether it is through an organizational structure or through an informal 
commune, this can be deemed civil society. The development of this voice will ultimately help 
bring about democratization through actions that go “toward a broader range of popular voices; 
toward greater equality among these voices; toward the increased binding of rulers’ actions by 
popular voice; and toward greater protection of popular voice from arbitrary action by rulers and 
their agents” (Tilly 2007, 18).  
Religious State  
Another interesting aspect of civil society development is of course mobilization, which 
is at the center of Internet studies in democratization. Specifically, in terms of religious 
mobilization, Lerner discusses “Islamic activism,” which she describes as the “mobilization of 
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contention to support Muslim causes” (Lerner 2010, 556).  Many theorists question whether or 
not this kind of activism is in fact comparable to more traditional, Western ideas of activism. 
Lerner, in her discussion of Muslim activism in the context of social movement theory, 
ultimately concludes that this idea of Islamic exceptionalism is flawed. These theorists argue that 
the propagation of Muslim themes and ideologies through these mobilization tactics in fact 
corroborate this exceptionalism. However, as Lerner is quick to note, while the cultural themes 
being disseminated through mobilization may be different, at their core, the “dynamics, process, 
and organization” of Islamic activism are very similar (Lerner 2010, 556-557).  
This important commonality actually helps me define what I mean by “religious state” in 
my hypothesis agenda. Lerner’s inclusion of Islamic state actors to the practitioners of traditional 
social movements through her discussion of Islamic activism is poignant. Primarily it adds a 
neutrality to the subject area in relation to state actors that will be important to my study, but it 
also provides justification to what I call a “religious state.” Simply put, in terms of my study, a 
religious state will be one that has a significant level of religious activism, like that of “Islamic 
activism.” Additionally, there must be action on the government’s end in promotion of that 
religion, in spite of varying amounts of authoritarianism. Of course, this definition will 
immediately call to attention Islamic states, specifically Iran, Egypt, and other states along the 
Maghreb of Africa and within the Arabian Peninsula.  
However, I would also include in this list of “religious states” Israel, a fundamentally 
Judaic state with a democratic structure laced in religious principles and stringent support for 
Jewish customs. Moreover, the predominant Judaic bent of Israel by way of the “differential 
level of governmental, municipal and public services available to [different] population groups 
(meaning Jewish vs. Arab, Bedouin, etc.)” is similar, admittedly to a far lesser extent than in 
Warycha   17 
 
most Muslim states, to the kinds of Islamic activism prevalent in Lerner’s study of Iran and 
Egypt (Lerner 2010; Yablon & Katz 2010, 176-177). 
Democracy/Democratization 
 This inclusion of Israel would appear to muddle the system design of my research, as 
Israel is fundamentally different from  the Islamic states through which my analysis finds its 
origin. While this is true, and it is something that I will address later in discussing my 
methodology, my inclusion of Israel, and my discussion at large of democracy, points to a vital 
avenue of discussion. What is democracy? What is democratization? Like civil society, defining 
democracy has resulted in factious debate amongst scholars and pundits, and has resulted in no 
authoritative or conclusively universal definition.  
For the purposes of this research I find the works of Larry Diamond to be elucidatory in 
this realm. The breadth of democracy studies and definitions is often difficult to dig through, as it 
is entrenched in various different cases with varying levels of specificity, which can ultimately 
frame the way scholars construe their lexicon. As a precursor, there are two variants of 
definitions by scholars: those that are “thin,” and those that are “thick.” By thin, I refer to those 
definitions that find democracy to be any government that has regular, free and fair elections. 
“Thick” definitions, by contrast, have a laundry list of attributes that must be fulfilled in order to 
be considered a democracy, including freedom of religion/belief/association, checks on power, 
and due process in addition to regular, free and fair elections (Diamond 2008, 21-22). For 
simplicity, I will be looking at democracy as those governments that have free and fair elections 
on a regular basis. I find this to be acceptable as democracy will be implicit to my discussion, but 
not an overt aspect of it. 
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When looking at religious states, especially those that are Islamic, it may be difficult to 
use this definition of democracy as most countries of an Islamic activist bent have yet to have 
free or fair elections, if they have ever had them. Predominantly autocratic states exist in the 
Middle East, and with a great degree of perdurability. Therefore, the concept of democratization 
becomes of the utmost importance to this study. Moreover, because of empirical evidence 
provided in two significant case studies in the region, it appears that the Internet may have the 
capacity to reinforce authoritative regimes, instead of to illegitimate them (Wheeler 2006; 
Kalathil & Boas 2003). However, the Internet in these studies did have the capacity to call into 
question the regime and create networks amongst citizens connected to the Web, something that 
I have already argued to be a development in civil society. So, in this scenario, what is evidenced 
is not a democracy, but a step in the long process of democratization. Tilly (2007b) proposes that 
when looking at democracy, considering it as a process is far more prudent than simply 
considering it as a noun. Decreeing this as “static,” Tilly argues that democracy is a living, 
breathing process, and because of this, it can also experience a series of trends in the reverse 
(18). Larry Diamond (2008), aligning himself with Tilly, asserts that democratization has key 
features, of which civil society development is paramount in my research. It would be foolish, 
however, to say that these cases examined by Wheeler, Kalathil, and Boas are evidentiary of 
democratization in the Middle East. Rather, these cases exhibit a developing civil society, which 
is often seen as a precursor to democracy. It is not exhaustive in this ability.  
Case Selection 
 After establishing the key features through which I will be exploring the Internet in 
fundamentally religious states, I begin elucidating on the reasoning behind the states I have 
chosen to explore. In terms of this paper, it is important to understand the Islamic religious 
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component in the face of the Internet, as this has been a fundamentally predominant aspect of 
religious and democratization studies. However, for a basis of comparison, I felt as though I 
would need another case which one could define as a religious state, but was not Islamic. 
Ultimately, in order to atomize the effect of the Internet on religious states, the research needs 
not to make direct statements about Islam, but a statement on religion as a whole. With this in 
mind, Israel looked to be a viable option.  
 Israel is an interesting case to evaluate because it is the only democracy in the Middle 
East. While it may seem counterintuitive to include a detailed qualitative study of Israel in a 
research set based on the development of civil society as a precursor of democracy, it provides a 
useful neutralizing feature in the overall scheme of Internet studies. Moreover, it is 
representative of an intensely religious state, but not an intensely Islamic state. Israel’s position 
as a Zionist and democratic state is interesting. With a parliamentary system, Israeli citizens elect 
representatives to a 120-seat Knesset, members of which elect a President for a seven-year term.  
However, certain stipulations exist to bar parties from entering into the parliamentary races. 
Specifically, Freedom House’s (2011) annual Freedom in the World report on Israel asserts that 
“parties or candidates that deny the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, oppose the democratic 
system, or incite racism are prohibited.” Even still, Israel explicitly asserts her tolerance and 
respect for other religions. While there are controversial cases wherein this would seem to be less 
than true, those incidents are few and far between. 
 Compare the religious status of Israel to that of Iran, and one can see the remarkable 
differences between these two religious states. Iran, like Israel, has a parliamentary system of 
elections, although the freedom of those elections has been widely contested and deemed 
inappropriately conducted. Additionally, an unelected body called the Council of Guardians has 
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final say on which candidates are permitted to go through the final stages of the election process. 
In this way, the Council of Guardians has had a history of eliminating candidates from reformist 
or more liberally minded groups, therefore creating an intensely anti-democratic selection 
process for parliamentary positions. Iran has been intolerant of other religious practices as well, 
and the Special Court for the Clergy has frequently arrested those clerics and followers who have 
deviated the farthest from the fundamental Shiite majority of Iran. 
 Iran has also consistently jailed media and journalists during elections, in contrast to 
Israel, which has a celebrated liberally minded media. The elected officials, however, do not 
have much power beyond the supreme leader, the Ayatollah, who is elected by an Assembly of 
Experts. In fact, the Assembly of Experts has the power to overturn legislation produced by the 
parliament. One similarity between Israel and Iran, however, is the level of scandal associated 
with their government practices. Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions 
Index ranked Israel number 38 and Iran number 168. While this ranking does not infer that Israel 
is more “corrupt” than Iran, it does have a perception of corruption that is deemed greater.  
 Finally, I chose to discuss Egypt as another case due to the implications of former 
President Hosni Mubarak’s recent ouster following intense rioting and social media mobilization 
during the first quarter of 2011. What is evident about Egypt is its lack of an electoral 
democracy, in spite of the appearance of one. Mubarak, prior to February of 2011, had occupied 
the office of President since 1981. Around 2004, Mubarak had attempted to reinvigorate the 
government through a modernization process that introduced a new cabinet of technocrats, 
whom Mubarak thought would create  a visage of reform. Interestingly enough, Egypt excludes 
religiously founded parties from election procedures. However, this was more of a politically 
infused strategy used by the Mubarak regime to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from entering 
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into the race. Egypt was also ranked on the Transparency Index, but at 111, it stands between 
Israel and Iran.  
 Iran and Egypt share similarities in that Islam is the dominant religion of the state. In 
spite of Egypt’s charges to exclude religiously founded parties, in addition to parties founded on 
race, gender, or ethnicity, Egypt is a state deeply ingrained in Islamic practices. Additionally, 
similar to Iran, Egypt has maintained a strong control over the media, and has taken a variety of 
preventative measures to ensure that recalcitrant journalists remain out of the public eye and are 
silenced. However, in contrast to Iran, due to the governmental and political structure I have 
described, Egypt is typically understood to be secular. 
 Furthermore, where these countries do greatly differ is in the freedom of their Internet 
access. Israel has a very liberal Internet policy, whereas Iran and Egypt have an unequal level of 
freedom of access, and freedom of information when it comes to the Internet. As will become 
evident in my discussion of three events in each of these countries, the access to the Internet and 
the freedom through which information travels through that Internet will become of great 
importance in my ultimate findings. With disparate levels of either of these qualities, there will 
be significant differences in civil society and democratic processes. Due to this, my analysis of 
the Marvi Marmara cargo ship in Israel, the “Twitter Revolution” in Iran, and the very recent 
Mubarak coup in Egypt, will be able to present a breadth of evidence in the realm of civil society 
literature. 
Event Analysis 
The Flotilla Incident 
 On May 31, 2010, an international flotilla, which included the cruise ship Mavi 
Marmara, a cargo ship, and four smaller crafts, attempted to sail to Gaza with humanitarian aid 
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for the Palestinians residing there. Traveling on international waters, the flotilla was attacked by 
an Israeli naval force, killing nine passengers and injuring dozens more. Of those that were 
injured, many were treated in Israeli hospitals. The injured claimed poor treatment and 
humiliation at the hands of their Israeli doctors, with some exalting that they were abused. The 
documentation of the event itself, and the events thereafter, however, are ultimately sparse. All 
technology possessed by people on the flotilla, including cameras, recording equipment, 
computers, phones, and other personal effects, were detained by Israeli personnel shortly after 
the flotilla was attacked (Lightbown 2010, 1-2).  
 The media response following the incident has also been tepid in that there was no 
definitive answer as to what had happened. The United Nations Human Rights Council sought to 
uncover the hidden events through a fact finding mission, decrying the Israel response and their 
purported attempts to cover-up the occurrence. The events have also attracted legal attention 
from plaintiffs on the flotilla and with the Free Gaza movement through which the humanitarian 
aid was being supplied. However, these cases have faced trouble in gaining any traction because 
of the propaganda machine in Israel and their proliferation of, possibly, false information of the 
events, and those who were killed and injured during the attack, in the media and through the 
Internet. The incident itself therefore points to an authoritative, rational, and legitimate 
government power subverting information through the freedom that has been proliferated on the 
Internet throughout its country. Additionally, the questioning implied with the flotilla event is 
more pointedly aimed at government transparency.  
   However, in spite of government attempts to obfuscate information surrounding the 
event, the Internet helped give voice to those who would normally not be able to speak out. The 
Internet, coupled with an active foreign media helped uncover facts about the incident previously 
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unknown from official Israeli reports. They also helped to reinterpret certain Israeli reports, 
which, while not inaccurate, shed a new light on the occurrences of May 31, 2010 through new 
information and anecdotal evidence. 
 The anecdotes enumerated on the Internet and in newspaper and magazine reports are 
perhaps the most significant development. The Israeli government, in an attempt to avoid 
negative press, spun the story to elucidate various other features of what happened in late May of 
2010. Specifically, Israeli forces were quick in official reports to assert that the flotilla made a 
stop in Istanbul, picking up 40 more passengers, none of whom, it is believed, went through the 
necessary procedures to check for safety. As per an official of Free Gaza, a private security 
agency was hired to verify that the boats were devoid of weapons and that all passengers were 
not radical extremists. There were also reports of extremist behavior within the flotilla by 
individuals (Lightbown 2010, 3-6).  
 Still, in spite of any spin that may or may not have occurred at the hands of the Israeli 
government, the flotilla incident in 2010 is rather unique in Internet and national commentary 
literature. Where it is unique should be obvious in the context of this paper. In this case we have 
a democratic religious government reacting to exogenous forces that support another cause that 
is unpopular in their domestic politics. Israel, with a government that is far more transparent than 
the ones I will be discussing in Egypt and Iran, finds itself in a contradictory predicament. 
Against democratic ideals, information is apparently opaque to the press and the citizens of Israel 
in an effort to ensure international supremacy and good faith from other international actors. 
Israel has occupying powers over the Gaza strip, which hosts millions of Palestinians, and 
therefore control over the area. Israeli citizens overwhelmingly do not support a Palestinian-
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controlled Gaza, and therefore have less of an investment in decrying the actions of the 
government against a nonprofit, humanitarian group supporting Gaza refugees.  
 Thus, the anecdotes and the observations by those directly involved had very little effect 
on the development of civil society within the religiously homogenous Israel. Due to their 
overall liberal ideology in domestic politics, an adherence to an open media, and a very 
accessible Internet (over 70%), commenters and bloggers on the Internet sharing their 
experiences and opinions had little effect on the general democratic landscape of Israel. 
Moreover, many of those using the Internet to proliferate a conspiracy theory were admittedly 
anti-Zionist and not Israeli (“Israel Internet Usage and Marketing Report” 2009). The response to 
the flotilla event, in the media and on the Internet, would appear to have done very little to 
increase, or for that matter, decrease the amount of civil society in Israel. This could be for a 
variety of factors, as enumerated previously. Thus, one may be able to determine that in an 
already developed democratic society with highly sophisticated citizens and an extensive 
technological infrastructure, the Internet does little to affect civil society development within a 
country. 
The Twitter Revolution of Iran 
 In the realm of social media, Twitter is of indelible concern to democratization and social 
mobilization theorists for two reasons: it is public and it is virtually unstoppable. Twitter updates, 
or “tweets,” go out on two networks—the Internet and SMS, which is used for text messaging 
systems. Additionally, Twitter is a broadcast service, unlike Facebook or MySpace, and can 
therefore allow for messages to be accessed by virtually anyone. These two characteristics make 
Twitter interesting for theorists because it is a soapbox for all citizens with Internet or phone 
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access and that message can be similarly accessed by anyone with similar connectivity 
(Grossman 2009).  
 This of course points to the larger argument residing in the civil society literature. As 
more people join together, through whatever means, the more power they have in a system, and 
the stronger the case for democracy becomes. A social mobilization tool over the Internet would 
of course indicate that civil society would be at the zenith of its development in any society or 
state. This is the argument for what occurred in the summer of 2009 during the elections in Iran. 
With the advent of social media upon them, discontent Iranians took to the information highways 
following corrupt electoral procedures. Disputing the victory of Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, the Iranian people used the Internet to mobilize protests across the country. What 
made this election unusual was the high voter turnout, and, of course, the technological 
innovations of the time. Moreover, there appeared to be discrepancies at the provincial level, 
wherein a previously unrecorded conservative subset was apparently voting for Ahmadinejad. 
The results also implied that previously Reformist party voters had voted significantly in favor of 
Ahmadinejad, in spite of continued conflict. Still, it was not the first time that Iranian elections 
had produced suspicious results. However, now, where there had previously been roadblocks, 
there were roads, and it became difficult for the government to shut down the networks through 
which “tweets” could travel.  
 Twitter’s resilience to censorship, an important distinction from other social media Web 
sites, is not the only reason for such widespread use of the technology. The site’s ability to 
consolidate certain messages in the same server makes it easier for revolutionaries and dissidents 
to follow the activity in the country. Similar protests occurred in Moldova prior to the summer of 
2009 with similar reasons. In these scenarios, Twitter became a way to organize and mobilize a 
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group of people who would have otherwise never met. Common “hashtags,” aka the term used to 
signify a “trending” or popular topic on Twitter, in June of 2009 in Iran included “IranElection.” 
“IranElection” was used by Twitter users in order to brief all readers of what was going on in the 
country. As one Iranian recounts, “We have no national press coverage in Iran, everyone should 
help spread Moussavi’s message. One person equals one broadcaster” (Stone & Cohen 2009).  
 The literature in the realm of civil society revealed that exogenous forms of civil society 
development can actually have an adverse effect on democratization processes (McGlinchey and 
Johnson 2007; Best and Wade 2009). New reports indicate that non-Iranians or refugee Iranian 
citizens were actually composing many tweets being sent out onto the Twitter networks outside 
of the country. Ultimately, it is difficult to detect empirically from where these messages were 
coming. As the Iranian government began to shut down servers and diminish connectivity across 
the country, many proxy servers opened up from neighboring countries. One server abroad can 
provide connections for about 750 people at any one moment. There were reported proxy 
services coming from as far away from Iran as San Francisco (Stone & Cohen 2009). Theorists 
argue that foreign aid in this manner can be harmful to proper development within the country 
for culturally significant forms of civil society (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009).  
 Many have even argued that the explanation of social media and the Internet as a 
proliferation of such civic engagement and acts of mobilization are merely ways for “Western” 
theorists and diplomats to make sense of what occurred in Iran. Alex Burns and Eltham (2009) 
elaborate, “Iran’s domestic politics lies outside the Lockean political universe which has shaped 
US foreign policy thinking… this incommensurability lies at the heart of why a social media 
solution may have appealed to US State Department policymakers” (299-300). Looking at the 
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extant literature on Western conceptions of mobilization and civil society, there is some validity 
in this assessment.  
 Moreover, the religious component of this state does not come into play in this scenario. 
So, arguably, assessing the proliferation of the Internet in a fundamentalist religious state may be 
moot. Contextually, the differences between sophisticated Western uses of modern technology 
and states with a heavy religious bent will be severe. However, particularly in the case of 
electoral procedures, the issue is already so predominantly not-religious at the surface, that it is 
difficult to see whether or not a religious background has anything to do with mobilization and 
civil society development.   
 Regardless of these qualms and questions, the main question, as always, is, did the 
Internet component actually increase civil society in the country? Ultimately, it appears that it 
did not, in this limited instance. In fact, forms of protest similar to this has not been uncommon 
in the country, albeit with different pieces forming a familiar puzzle. Iran has no real 
parliamentary system, despite its declarations. This is also in spite of a reformist legislature. The 
obstacles that exist in the Iranian Constitution and within the legal framework are too significant 
to allow for democratization. The stringent qualities that are inhibited to the governmental 
framework of Iran has burned the people before and led to upsets in Tehran. Only 6 years prior 
to the 2009 elections, university-student demonstrations erupted when the courts voted to 
execute a professor and strong advocate of democracy and freedom of speech for the “crime of 
blasphemy” (Jahanbegloo 2003, 159-161). While the students received victory in the Courts 
decision to release their professor, it also perpetuated an illegitimate legislature and the 
supremacy of the judiciary.  
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 In this scenario, much like the “Twitter Revolution,” it appears that the civil society that 
appeared to be developing through group-augmented activity may actually be more reflective of 
a social movement, which has a more stated beginning, middle, and end. While I have used the 
two terms loosely in conjunction with one another, a social movement is ultimately different 
from civil society. The two share many similar characteristics. They are both group oriented, 
with the capacity to include thousands and more members depending on various factors. They 
are organized around similar goals and activities which bind them together. Finally, they have 
the capacity to be political, with social movements obviously being almost exclusively political 
in nature.  
 When looking at the 2009 Iranian election, it is hard to definitively assert that what 
occurred because of the Internet was actually civil society development. Again, there is little 
empirical evidence suggesting that these kinds of relationships continue beyond the initial 
incident. There are even more questions surrounding whether or not there were actually very 
many Iranians involved at all. This lack of data makes the case far more difficult to evaluate. In 
this way, the Twitter Revolution proves to be lacking as a proper means of evidence for the 
Internet having a positive function in the civil societies of religious states.   
The Fall of Mubarak 
 Finally, it becomes of great pertinence to the civil society and Internet literature theorists 
to discuss the recent events that have continued to transpire in Egypt since the fall of the Hosni 
Mubarak regime. The immediacy of the event and its freshness in the news cycle makes it an 
interesting case. Like the Twitter Revolution in Iran, the revolts that occurred in Egypt in early 
2011 reflect a growing trend of social media virtually mobilizing masses of publicly censored 
citizens. In addition, similarly, to the events of 2009 in Iran, the ensuing revolts were resultant of 
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election procedures. However, where Iran and Egypt differ in this respect is in the persistence of 
the Egyptian revolts and the apparent success of them.  
 During the latter half of this past January, ignited by a series of protests in other Middle 
Eastern and Islamic countries, Egyptian citizens rallied and called for the end of the nearly 30 
year reign of President Hosni Mubarak. After nearly twenty days of protest, Mubarak stepped 
down from the presidency and many unpopular provisions of the Egyptian Constitution were 
amended or redacted. The military stepped in at the behest of the Egyptian people and other 
intervening countries’ diplomats, and it continues to lead the country. Questions regarding the 
military’s support of Mubarak’s confidantes at the top of the government and a new law passed 
in March paving way for new elections have been raised in Egypt.  
 How did this occur? In a country of roughly 80 million, about 20 million of those people 
have access to the Internet. Egypt is also in a unique position in that many connections between 
Asia and Europe are routed through their systems, as they are one of the more advanced 
“technocrats” in the region. So, when all four Egyptian ISPs were seemingly dropped, including 
various cell phone providers, questions arose. Partly reactionary to the social media infused 
uprisings in Tunisia and partly preemptive of its own people, the Egyptian government attempt 
to choke the Internet at exchange points was somewhat ineffective. Like in Iran, the way the 
Internet and several innovations on the Internet have evolved over time, simply turning the “off 
switch” is no longer a viable option to silence a discontented public. Satellite communication, 
landlines, and the ever-durable Twitter were still available means of interaction outside the 
country (Chen 2011, 1-2). The government shutdown of the Internet points to the possibly 
revolutionary characteristic of social media. While the successes of this kind of mobilization and 
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development is still being questioned, the mere fact that Egyptian leadership took such action 
reveals the inherent power in the Internet as a unifying force against oppression. 
 Regardless, as was the concern of scholars in regards to the Twitter Revolution, it is 
questionable as to how much the Internet really did to affect the outcome of Mubarak finally 
stepping down in mid February of 2011. As previously asserted, while roughly 20 million of its 
people have access to the Internet, that is only about a quarter of the population. More precarious 
is that over 30% of Egyptians are illiterate. This of course introduces some legitimacy questions 
in regards to the Internet usage in the country. Specifically, if that many people are not literate, 
then how can a meaningful and sophisticated civil society develop from the Internet? The 
presence of educated leaders may indicate that a civil society can develop, but how can these 
leaders reach a significant portion of the population via the Internet when they are illiterate? It 
should also be noted that on January 27, the first day of the major protests in Tahrir Sqaure, that 
Internet usage was reportedly close to zero following a government shutdown of all endogenous 
networks. In spite of this, thousands upon thousands of Egyptian citizens marched onto Tahrir 
Square in protest of the Mubarak regime (Al Sharekh 2011, 54-57). Some organizers sent 
messages from exogenous networks while the rest was spread by word. It can be safely assumed 
that while the Internet played a huge role at the start, it may have been less significant as the 
revolts proceeded. Additionally, the added factor that Mubarak stepped down due to foreign 
insistence along with citizen uprising complicates a measurement of how the Internet shaped the 
debate, at the moment.  
 Taking this into consideration, what effect did the Internet have at all? How did the 
Internet come to be involved in the media’s interpretations of the Egyptian protests? It would not 
be fair to say that the Internet was not involved in the mass protests. However, at the same token, 
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it would be disingenuous to grant it complete credit. In fact, the reason the Internet appears so 
frequently in reports from Egypt has something to do with Western journalism. Specifically, 
American norms and values played a role in this miscommunication. In America, the Internet is 
seen as an “equalizing” force in the world because of its information spreading capabilities. As 
one scholar observes of the world, “People realized that the most powerful aspect of the Internet 
is its ability to bring together people of similar interests (academic or otherwise) and enable them 
to become patterns in a virtual community, where they could interact freely in real time or at 
least in a very fast manner” (Abdulla 2010, 30-31). However, despite the Internet’s ability to join 
together communities, it cannot be safely assumed that it has the ability to change the 
infrastructures of civil societies in oppressive government regimes like Egypt and Iran. 
 Additionally, the vital role that the decidedly religious Muslim Brotherhood played in the 
mobilization of protesters that led to the resignation of Mubarak is a troubling aspect to my 
hypothesis’s validity. While one may argue that the Internet’s role in this uprising did foster 
some form of development on the civil society front, in that many people are now more likely to 
align themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood due to their visibility in the region, that civil 
society development will not likely result in democratization. The Muslim Brotherhood has had a 
complex history with cases of intolerance and questionable equity practices. The history of 
similar uprisings giving way to democratically elected religious majorities has shown that 
regimes have remained oppressive or become even more so, which was the case in Palestine, 
Algeria, and Sudan (Al Sharkeh 2011, 58-60). Finally, the evidence and data collected on this 
event are very new, and it is likely that more will be understood in the coming months about the 
Egyptian revolts.  
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Conclusion 
 It can safely be assumed that the Internet does not actually have a great effect on the 
development of civil society in religious states. Still, it is obvious that the Internet can play a 
positive role in development. The reactions by governments when met with revolutionary fervor 
on the Internet seems to indicate that the Internet, when unencumbered by serious government 
intervention, can and will have a mobilizing and civil society developing bent. The example of 
Egypt is profound in that the initial government shut down of the Internet, while successful, 
could not silence its people. The perdurable quality of the Internet, in that once something is 
written it can never be unwritten, is somewhat unique to civil society development. Therefore, 
when government controls of the Internet were lifted in response to foreign pressure, the revolts 
intensified as more information became streamed. When one looks at the Iran example, this 
quality can also be examined. The main difference between the two cases is the level of 
censorship and the sensitivity to foreign actors. 
  While I would have expected to have found differing results in more autocratic and 
authoritative regimes like those in Iran and Egypt compared to a democratic government like 
Israel, what I found was that all of their governments do censor the Internet, albeit in varying 
degrees. While in Israel most of the censorship was in the kinds of information being released 
over the Web by journalists, in Egypt and Iran, where journalism and open media is not 
prevalent, it was more common for the regimes there to simply “shut off” and stop the Internet. 
Keeping these networks from functioning in a meaningful way was a governmental attempt to 
prevent massive protest and organization. Government action against the Internet reveals the 
threat that authoritative regimes feel from the possibility of net-based mobilization. If the 
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Internet is left uncensored, it has the potential to mobilize people and actually facilitate 
movements.  
 This also points to another issue in the theoretical sense: what is mass mobilization and 
what is civil society? In looking at the literature, while they have many similarities, the 
differences between the two seem to indicate that these events described previously are more 
akin to a social movement than to civil society development. In Iran, for example, the revolutions 
were finite. The “Twitter Revolution” had a definitive beginning and end. Once the opposition 
was silenced by the government authority, the movement ceased to be a presence in the public’s 
eye. The same can be said of Mubarak’s resignation and the Egyptian “revolution” from earlier 
this year. While those events are still unfolding, it does seem that it was more so a social 
movement since no significant groups have risen from the ashes of Mubarak’s fall. Moreover, 
this was a case wherein there was a singular goal to oust the Mubarak regime. Arguably, once 
that goal was achieved, the level of involvement decreased dramatically. 
 One could argue that the Muslim Brotherhood stands to gain a lot of power from this 
event. I argue that this is still not strong enough evidence for civil society development. The 
Muslim Brotherhood existed prior to 2011, and the addendum to the Constitution allowing for 
greater access for all groups in electoral procedures does not indicate that civil society will 
develop. This is a far more political in nature development than cultural, which is usually more 
indicative of civil society. The decidedly undemocratic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood is also 
a troubling aspect in this regard, too.  
 In terms of democratization, as was indicated in the literature review, many theorists 
actually find the Internet and civil society to sometimes be adversarial to democracy 
development. Civil society is usually less contentious in the social sciences, in that many agree 
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on its basic terms and its implications. However, there is some evidence that the Internet can 
affect democracy detrimentally, In Egypt and Iran, Internet users proliferating negative sentiment 
for the government were found using the very medium through which they attempted to attack 
their governments. The Internet can actually be a tool to “track down troublemakers” in 
repressive regimes. It also allows for governments to monitor more closely its most recalcitrant 
members of society. This is not isolated to authoritative governments. The United States of 
America uses similar procedures using the USA PATRIOT Act. There have been several 
initiatives in Congress to grant more powers to the executive in the realm of Internet 
technologies in order to protect critical infrastructures. To a learned member of society, this 
could be interpreted as but another way for the government to co-opt free speech in order to 
prevent terrorism and other atrocities. Regardless, this “double-edged sword” aspect of the 
Internet, in that it has the ability to promote greater freedom but also smother it, is something 
that can be observed in the Iranian and Egyptian cases. Remarkably, what I find interesting, is 
that governments should be concerned about the power of the Internet, and their reactions to 
disobedience on the Web is not unfounded for authoritative regimes. The Internet has the ability 
to foster negative sentiment for a government, and, as has been observed in the cases, it can have 
the power to unseat powerful regimes.   
 So, where can the research go in the future? Obviously, more empirical evidence needs to 
be collected in regards to Internet activities abroad. While certain journals and databases do exist 
that elaborate on Internet usage in various countries, the level of accuracy is debatable. 
Additionally, more work needs to be done in order to measure the level of civil society in the 
world. There have been substantive efforts to do this, specifically by the World Bank and the 
United Nations, with a major effort currently being undertaken by CIVICUS in their Civil 
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Society Index (CSI). What this research will imply and assert on the state of civil society 
development is yet unknown, but it is likely to invigorate the field substantially.  
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